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Abstract
Badges are endemic to online interaction sites, from Question and
Answer (Q&A) websites to ride sharing, as systems for rewarding par-
ticipants for their contributions. This paper studies how badge de-
sign affects people’s contributions and behavior over time. Past work
has shown that badges “steer” people’s behavior toward substantially
increasing the amount of contributions before obtaining the badge,
and immediately decreasing their contributions thereafter, returning
to their baseline contribution levels. In contrast, we find that the
steering effect depends on the type of user, as modeled by the rate
and intensity of the user’s contributions. We use these measures to
distinguish between different groups of user activity, including users
who are not affected by the badge system despite being significant
contributors to the site. We provide a predictive model of how users
change their activity group over the course of their lifetime in the
system. We demonstrate our approach empirically in three different
Q&A sites on Stack Exchange with hundreds of thousands of users,
for two types of activities (editing and voting on posts).
1 Introduction
Many online platforms rely on the motivation of volunteers rather than on
paid workers to create content [21]. Examples include Wikipedia, Reddit,
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Question and Answer (Q&A) sites like Stack Overflow, and citizen science
platforms in which non-experts collaborate with scientists to accelerate sci-
entific discoveries [30]. Moreover, social-media websites also rely, to a large
degree, on users for creating content.
Keeping users productive and motivated is essential to the success of
such peer production sites [30]. One of the most commonly used incentive
mechanisms used by these sites are badge systems, which provide users with
credentials that display skills and achievements on the site [28, 8]. Badge
systems partition the set of participants into “status classes” that reflect
their contributions according to a particular metric [20]. When administered
successfully, badge systems can influence users’ behavior and direct them
towards types of activities encouraged by the system designers [3]. The use
of badges can also signal expertise or experience to users as well as to wider
communities [18].
Despite the massive use of badges in online communities1, Q&A sites2,
ridesharing3 and more, our understanding of the interplay between user be-
havior and badge design is still lacking.
Much previous work has focused on badges’ “steering” effect [2, 25]. That
is, users’ contribution levels rise as they get closer to the threshold that is
required for obtaining the badge, and experience a sharp decline following it,
returning to their baseline contribution levels.
In this paper we show that the steering effect is not homogenous, but
varies across different types of users. Our data is taken from the Stack Ex-
change platform, which hosts a collection of Q&A websites, each devoted to
a different topic and includes hundreds of thousands of users. We focused on
the largest project of the platform, the programming-related Stack Overflow
(we also analysed data from several of the smaller projects, like Ask Ubuntu
and TeX-LaTeX but as results are similar we will often refer mainly to Stack
Overflow).
We examine two common and general tasks on Stack Overflow: voting on
other people’s posts, and editing others’ posts for corrections and clarifica-
tions. We chose these badge types because they represent fundamental and
popular activities in Stack Exchange, hence our insights are representative
of the general population of users. We show that the user population can be
1e.g., http://duolingo.wikia.com/wiki/Achievements
2e.g., https://askubuntu.com/help/badges
3e.g., https://blog.lyft.com/badge-glossary/
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clustered into 3 separate groups, differentiated by the frequency and inten-
sity of their work on the task. We show that users in each of these different
groups experience steering in a different way, and we examine their short
and long term reaction to receiving badges. In particular, we find that some
users do not return to their baseline levels of contributions after receiving
the badge. For these users, badges act as a catalyst for long-term activity on
the platform, creating a sustained level of activity over an extended period
of time.
We provide a computational model for predicting whether a user will
decrease her level of contribution to a lower activity group on the site fol-
lowing a badge award. This model can inform the design of personalized
intervention methods to increase the contributions of such users. Our work
has insights for system designers in showing that badges are not a “one size
fits all” incentive and it suggests ways to adapt existing badge designs to the
diversity of user behavior.
This paper extends a prior conference submission which focused on the
SO project in several ways. First, we extend our results to an additional
class of voting actions and show that our model generalizes well to this new
class. Second, we examine the interaction between different types of badges.
Lastly, we extend the related work section to provide more comprehensive
background of badge design and user behavior in the literature.
2 Related Work
Badge design and the effects of badges on people’s interactions with online
systems has been studied in the social and computational sciences. Hickey
et al. [18] outlined key guidelines for successful badge design, such as trans-
parency (the badge system should be known and understood by all users,
badges should be visible), interactions (badge systems are more successful
in settings where there is a high degree of interaction between participants),
and uniqueness (badge systems should be the sole incentive mechanism in
the domain setting). Different sites use different badge designs, each with
its own particular purpose [13]. For example, some badges award users for
contributing valuable content while others award users for being among the
most prolific contributors of the site.
A few studies model the influence of badges on user behavior in social
media and Q&A sites [31, 8, 2, 25, 16]. Most central to our work are the
3
studies by Anderson et al. [2] and Li et al. [25] which describe the “steering”
phenomena towards a badge boundary: As users approach the threshold of
the required number of actions needed to earn a badge (day zero), they in-
crease their contributions needed for the badge. The total amount of actions
that are influencing the earning of the badge increases significantly in the
days that are prior to earning the badge, in a comparison to earlier days and
the days after getting the badge. Bosu et al. [7] analyzed the social network
inferred from participants’ questions and answers on the site, inferring how
to obtain reputation scores quickly on the cite. Other works have studied the
role of personality traits, as inferred by their SO messages, on their badge
behavior [27, 5]. Bornfeld and Rafaeli [6] provided a longitudinal analysis of
feedback (votes and responses) as a mechanism for increasing contributions
among newcomers in five Stack Exchange communities, including SO.
Anderson et al. [2] present a mathematical model which describes the de-
viation of distribution over user actions before and after receiving the badge.
They use the model to demonstrate the steering effect of badges on user vot-
ing behavior on Stack Overflow, and a few empirical studies followed [14].
However, our results paint a more complicated picture than these, as we show
that the steering effect is not homogeneous, and differs across different types
of users. We also study the long-term effect of badges over the lifetime of
interaction of users in the system.
Several works have studied badges in the context of academic courses.
Anderson et al. [3] studied badge design and its effect on student behavior
in a large student forum in a massive open online course (MOOC). They
showed that placing several badges of smaller value that are well dispersed
in the course can be more effective than having a single badge of higher value.
Hakulinen et al. [15] showed that rewarding students taking a computer
science course with achievement badges motivated students and encouraged
desired study practices. Charleer et al. [9] studied different visualizations
of badges that reward students’ forum activity in a course. They compared
personal dashboards, where students can observe each other’s badge achieve-
ments, and an augmented version in which students could discuss the badge
achievements with each other. They showed that the personal dashboard
improved awareness of the course’s goals, while the interactive visualization
improved the students’ collaboration and reflection on the coursework.
Abramovich et al. [1] used an intelligent tutoring system that notified
students whenever they earned a badge and explained the reason for earning
it. This approach led to an improvement in students’ engagement and a de-
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crease in counter-productive behavior, when compared to badge-less tutoring
systems.
Badges have been used in gamified apps, as systems designers use game
design elements to improve user engagement and experience [28, 12, 17].
Gamification is studied from the aspects of psychology [26], game theory [13,
22], and economics [17]. Common gamification elements includes the use of
points, levels, leaderboards, time constraints, badges and more [28]. Jia et al.
[23] present a survey study investigating the relationships among individuals’
personality traits and perceived preferences for various gamification elements.
Badge design has also been studied from a game theoretic perspective [13].
Immorlica et al. [20] studied badge design mechanisms aiming to maximize
the total contributions made to a website. Users exert an effort (which carries
a cost) to contribute and, in return, are rewarded with badges. Badge valu-
ations are determined by the number of users who earn each badge. Aoyagi
[4] considered the role of badge design as what feedback to provide to two
agents in a two-round contest. The agents can expend some amount of effort
in each round, with a noisy mapping between effort and score. Both papers
characterize the equilibrium strategies that need to hold in their respective
model.
Finally, several works criticized the use of badges as an incentive mech-
anism [11], claiming that badges may undermine intrinsic motivation. In
particular, Kobren et al. [24] found that students tend to drop out of e-
learning systems just after obtaining the necessary amount of questions to
achieve the relevant badge.
3 Setting and Research Questions
The setting for this work is the Stack Exchange (SE) platform, a network of
173 question-and-answer (Q&A) websites on topics in diverse fields, in which
users post and respond to questions4.
For the investigation that follows, we chose the following three projects
in SE which vary widely in their topics and in the number of active users.
Stack Overflow (about 9,000,000 users) deals exclusively with program-
ming and is the biggest and most popular site on SE;
4https://stackexchange.com/. User data from SE is freely available.
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Figure 1: An example of a post in the Stack Overflow project (top) which
has been up-voted 42 times (left) and an edit activity to the post (bottom)
Ask Ubuntu (about 474,000 users) a site for users and developers of the
Ubuntu operating system;
TeX-LaTeX (about 67,000 users) a site for users of TEX, LATEX, ConTeXt,
and related typesetting systems.
The primary purpose of each SE site is to enable users to post questions
so other users can answer them. In order to improve both questions and
answers, users can also edit and comment on each other’s posts. This allows
users to correct existing posts (e.g., in the case of typos) or to provide insights
about the post content. Users can also vote (up or down) for posts, providing
a reputation score that is displayed on the user profile. By performing actions
such as posting questions or answers, voting on posts and editing existing
posts, users can increase their reputation score on the site, and unlock various
privileges [7]. Figure 1 shows an example of a post (top) which has been
6
Figure 2: Percentage of edit-actions contributions for winners of bronze, silver
and gold badges
upvoted (left) with an edit action (bottom) in SO. Of course, the multitude
of users (as in other crowdsourced projects, such as Wikipedia), are casual
ones, who only access content on the website but do not actively contribute
to it.
All SE projects employ badges to incentivize contributions by users.
There are more than 100 different badge types in SE, each divided to three
ranks in increasing order of importance: bronze, silver and gold. To differen-
tiate between them, SE has aliases for the different type of badges that one
can earn. For example, edit-type badges in SE sites use the aliases “Editor”
for a bronze badge value, “Strunk & White” for a silver badge value, and
“Copy Editor” for a gold badge value. The badges rewarding voting actions
are “Supporter” or “Critic” for one’s first vote (depending on if it was an
up-voter or down-vote) as the bronze badge; “Civic Duty”, given after vot-
ing 300 or more times (regardless of the vote type) is the silver badge; and
“Electorate”, given to users after voting on 600 questions (of which at least
25% are on questions), is the gold badge.
3.1 The Edit Badges Data
We will initially focus on the edit badge. Our analysis is based on data of
user interactions on the SO project from September 2008 and up to May
2019. Figure 2 shows the percentage of edit-action contributions made by
winners of the different badge types.
We are particularly interested in the 14,276 users who achieved the silver
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badge; 2,687 of these users went on to achieve the gold badge. Together, this
group made the vast majority of edit contributions to the site. Understanding
how these users behave can inform the design of future incentive mechanisms
in the site. Although winners of the bronze badge make up the vast majority
of the user population (more than 90%), they do not provide a substantial
contribution of edit actions to the site. In Section 8 we explore how the
badge system might be designed to encourage more participation from the
users who only achieved the bronze badge.
3.2 Research Questions
Our research focuses on the way badges affect different users. We are par-
ticularly interested in the steering phenomenon identified by Anderson et al.
[2], where users tend to increase their contribution rates as they approach the
badge goal. We are also interested in modeling how badges affect people’s
long term behavior on the platform.
We study the following research questions:
1. Is steering one-size-fits-all? Do different user populations experience
steering in different ways?
2. How do badges affect the long term behavior of individual users through-
out the lifetime of their interaction in the system?
3. Does the steering effect identified by Anderson et al. [2], and our find-
ings on the edit badge, extend to other types of actions and SE projects,
beyond voting actions in Stack Overflow (SO)?
We first focus, for the first two questions, on analyzing badge behavior for
edit actions. Frequent edit type actions in SE include correcting grammatical
errors or misspellings in a post, or adding explanations to the existing post
content. The thresholds for achieving the bronze, silver and gold badges
are a single edit action, 80 edit actions, and 500 edit actions respectively.
These threshold values are standardized across all of the SE projects. Our
hypothesis was that different types of users “steer” differently, i.e., they vary
in the extent to which they respond to badges. Moreover, we believe that
individual users vary in how the badges affect their behavior throughout the
course of their lifetime on the system. For the third question, we widen our
angle to more SE projects and other badges.
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4 Question 1: Is Steering One-Size-Fits-All?
In this section we study whether steering effects differ between different types
of users, as exhibited by their behavior on the site. Intuitively, users with
similar numbers of contributions may still exhibit widely different activity
styles. For example, consider two users; one of them performs 5 edit actions
each day of the week and the other performs 35 edit actions on Sunday nights.
In total, both users contribute an equal number of edit actions per week, but
clearly, they exhibit different behavior patterns on the site.
To distinguish between such users, we define two measures:
Work Consistency: The median number of days spent editing in a week.
Work Intensity: The median number of edits that a user makes in a day,
given the user makes at least one edit.
We chose these two measures because (1) they provide a general descrip-
tion of user activity in SE that does not depend on the action type itself
(e.g., the number of characters changed or added in an edit activity); (2)
they provide a simple and succinct way to differentiate between user behav-
ior in the site. For example, a user who was active for three days in the first
week of activity, five days in the second week of activity, and three days in
the third and final week of activity will have a consistency value of 3. Sim-
ilarly, a user who produced two edit actions in the first day of activity, ten
edits in the second day of activity, and five edits days in the third and final
day of activity will have an intensity value of 5. We considered the median
number of edit actions rather than the mean because the distribution over
edit actions per day is right-skewed and is highly affected by outliers.
4.1 Inferring User Groups
Using the notions of work consistency and intensity, we wish to group users
into distinct clusters of activity. In order to do so, we utilize the k-means
algorithm. Figure 3 plots the work consistency and intensity for the gold and
silver users in SE (recall this group contributes the vast majority of edits in
the system). The algorithm used the two measures to cluster users into three
groups of activity: low, medium and high. Groups are distinguished in the
figure using colors and boundary curves.
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Figure 3: Scatter plot of user activity showing three user groups revealed by
k-means (K=3). Groups are distinguished using colors and boundary curves.
The default distance metric used in k-means is euclidean distance between
datapoints and cluster centers. However this does not constitute a good
metric for the purposes of differentiating between groups with different levels
of contributions. For example, when using euclidean distance, if we consider
a cluster with (consistency, intensity) centroid (4, 5), and two users with
(consistency, intensity) measures of (1, 5) and (7, 5), the users would exhibit
the same distance from this cluster center. However they display different
activity levels. The first user works one day a week and would complete an
expected total of 5 edits per week, while the second works every day in the
week and would complete an expected total of 35 edits per week.
To this end, we define a custom distance that captures the expected
number of posts per week directly. For two users a and b and their respective
intensity and consistency (Ia, Ca, Ib and Cb), the distance d is defined as:
d(a, b) = ABS(Ia × Ca − Ib × Cb) (1)
The group centers can thus also be interpreted in terms of common number
of edits per week.
The clusters are formed in a transformed parameter space using the fol-
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Low Medium High
Silver users 10,022 1,380 287
Gold users 1,198 1,119 370
Total 11,220 2,499 657
Table 1: Number of gold and silver users in each activity group
lowing steps. First, we drop the users with consistency and intensity scores
greater than the 99.9 percentile in each case. This corresponds to 15 users
who all had an intensity greater than 20. Second, we normalize the data by
dividing by the maximum value and adding 1 to offset the effect of 0 values.
We choose k = 3 to facilitate the interpretation of the clusters. We aim
to describe general trends in the data while still accounting for the fact that
users are interacting with the system in unique ways. Increasing the cluster
parameter k to 4 simply had the effect of splitting the high-activity group
into two, thus complicating the further analysis unnecessarily.
Using the modified distance metric, the k-means algorithm reveals the
following three types of user groups. The low activity group describes “dab-
bler” users whose activity is characterized by low consistency and intensity
levels (contribute generally less than a single edit per week). The medium
activity group describes users who exhibited a medium level of intensity and
consistency (contribute generally between one and 8 edits per week and rarely
work more than 4 days for any given week). The high activity group describes
“busy bee” users who exhibited a high level of intensity (contribute gener-
ally more than 8 edits per week and regularly work on more than 3 days in
any given week). Returning to our example from above with the two users
described by (consistency, intensity), we can see that the first user is in the
medium activity group and the second user is in the “busy bee” group.
Table 1 shows the number of silver and gold users in each activity group.
As shown in the table, low-activity users make up the vast majority of the
user population, followed by the medium and high activity user groups. Gold
users make up just 16% of low activity users, 44% of the medium user group,
and over a half of the high user group. Thus, despite the lower rate of
contributions exhibited by the low/medium activity groups, they still make
up a substantial part of the contribution.
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Figure 4: Median number of edits per day, centered around the day-zero for
achieving the silver badge
4.2 Separating the Badge Effect
Figure 4 plots the contributions of the different engagement groups over time,
relative to day zero, when the silver badge was awarded to the user. As shown
in the figure, several days before day zero, there is no discernible difference
in the contribution levels of the three groups, as their usage pattern seems
to be identical across the clusters.
However, in the few days just before day zero, high-activity users experi-
ence a sharp rise in the number of edits per day leading into the silver badge
and maintain this high rate of editing for a number of weeks (!) after the
receiving the badge. The behavior of these users runs counter to Anderson
et al. [2]’s prediction that after receiving a badge, users will return to their
default levels of activity. In contrast, the other groups are far less affected by
the badge design. Both low and medium-activity groups exhibited a smaller
jump in contributions prior to day-zero (with low-activity also smaller than
medium-activity), and a steeper decline after this day. However, medium-
activity users did settle on contribution levels slightly above their previous,
pre-badge, default level, while low-activity users returned to their previous
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work habits. Notice that the low activity group is the largest and it therefore
dominates the trends when all of these users are aggregated. It is only when
we analyze these groups individually that this nuanced behavior becomes
apparent.
At the peak of the contribution level, there is a highly statistically sig-
nificant difference between the three levels of contributions; p  1 × 10−4
one-way ANOVA. Before obtaining the silver badge the difference between
the levels of contributions is not statistically significant (30 days before day
zero - p = 0.206 one-way ANOVA), while after obtaining it, the difference
stays significant (30 days after day zero - p 1× 10−4 one-way ANOVA).
5 Question 2: How do Long Term Group Dy-
namics Change in the Presence of Badges?
In this section we explore how users change their behavior over time. To this
end we track whether and how low, medium, and high-activity users change
group types before and after receiving badges in the system. Thus, we divide
users into groups for different parts of their life cycle in the system (before
badge/after badge, etc.).
We begin by tracking the long term behavior of users who received a silver
badge but not the gold badge (these users are responsible for 27% of user
contribution on the site, see Figure 2). Figure 5 is a Sankey diagram tracking
the flow of these users between the different group types. As can be seen, the
vast majority of users (including medium and high activity users) became,
once the badge was awarded, low activity users. Only a tiny minority of low
and medium users became high-activity users. The behavior of these users
agrees with the theory of steering, in that they returned to their usual work
patterns following the silver badge acquisition. In the discussion section we
discuss the implications of this behavior to facilitating badge design.
We now turn to track the long term behavior of users who received the
gold badge (these users are responsible for 53% of user contribution on the
site). Figure 6 shows the flow between groups for these users before obtaining
the silver badge (left), after obtaining the silver and before obtaining the gold
badge (middle) and after getting the gold badge (right). As shown by the
figure, the user shifting between groups is quite different than that of users
who did not obtain the gold badge (Figure 5). The users depicted here did not
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Figure 5: Flow between user groups before (left) and after (right) getting the
silver badge
Figure 6: Flow between user groups before getting the silver badge (left),
after getting the silver and before getting the gold badge (middle) and after
getting the gold badge (right).
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Edit Badges
no badge silver-edit gold-edit
Vote Badges no badge 1992 96
silver-vote 65822 5228 391
gold-vote 11091 5934 2676
Table 2: Amounts of users obtaining at least on of the four discussed badges
in SO
return to their normal routine once they achieved a silver badge. Instead,
they generally increased their activity – an overwhelming majority either
stayed at the same activity level or increased it, and for the medium and
low-activity users, a sizable majority strictly increased their activity levels to
become high-activity users. However, once the gold badge was achieved, most
of the users reverted to the same steering behavior identified by Anderson
et al. [2], and their activity levels decreased significantly.
5.1 Are Some Badges Gateways to Other Badge?
We now explore a different long term dynamic, on how two badges interact
with one another. One badge is the edit badge, which we have explored so
far, and the other, the voting badge, which we will delve into in section 7.2.
We use the available data on the period between September 2008 to May
2019 in SO.
Table 2 summarizes the amount of users in SO who obtained at least
one of the following badges: edit-silver, edit-gold, vote-silver or vote-gold.
Not surprisingly, the number of users with vote badges is significantly larger
than the amount of users who earned edit badges. This is, presumably, since
voting badges are far easier to achieve: while a single edit requires entering
a separate screen and making a change to the existing text, a vote requires
only a single click. However, what is evident from the data is that achieving
an edit badge is usually correlated with also achieving a vote badge. Indeed,
87% of the users who obtained the silver-edit badge also achieved the silver-
vote badge. On the other hand, only 15% of the users who obtained the
silver-vote badge also achieved the silver-edit badge.
When looking at the chronological order of obtaining these badges (Fig-
ure 7), some patterns emerge. The vast majority of the users begin by col-
lecting the vote-silver badge. Out of the users who start from getting the
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Figure 7: Chronological order of obtaining the edit and vote badges. People
who received only a single badge (silver-vote or silver-edit) are not shown.
silver-edit badge first, only a slight amount of users go on immediately for the
gold-edit badge. Instead, most of them go towards achieving the silver-vote
badge. Perhaps the gold-edit badge seems too hard to achieve at that point,
so they choose a different badge as their next goal.
Focusing on the most productive and engaged population (in terms of
editing and voting), this population includes 2,676 users who earned gold
badges for both voting and editing action types. These users performed
about 14.5 million votes out of all 138 million vote actions that were done
on SO (about 10%). Amazingly, these users performed about 3,700,000 edits
out of all 8,500,000 edit actions that were made on SO (about 43%!). As
shown by Figure 7, the most popular path for achieving the four badges is
in the following order:(1) silver-vote, (2) silver-edit, (3) gold-vote and (4)
gold-edit. These users first achieve all of the silver badges before moving on
to achieving all of the gold badges. In addition, they almost always choose
to achieve vote badges first.
Indeed, it seems these users are pursuing relatively short-term goals:
choosing the action type that belongs to the most reachable badge in terms of
its demands. According to this “algorithm”, the users begin with the easiest
action type (voting) and the closest badge (silver, by default). At this point,
the users prefer to pursue the silver-edit badge rather than or the gold-vote
badge, since the silver badge is more accessible for them. Moreover, it seems
that the relatively easy to achieve silver-vote badge serves as a gateway to
further badge achievements.
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Features # Features Accuracy F1 Weighted ROC AUC Confusion Matrix
User (U) 10 0.704 0.693 0.640
[7987 1549]
[2700 2140]
Edits (E) 9 0.680 0.633 0.569
[8680 856]
[3739 1101]
Temporal (T) 40 0.835 0.839 0.875
[7174 2362]
[12 4828]
U +E + T 59 0.837 0.842 0.875
[7236 2300]
[42 4798]
Table 3: Prediction results for user decreasing contribution levels after day
zero, using different combinations of features.
6 Question 2, Continued: Can We Model User
Behavior?
Our machine learning model seeks to understand which users are susceptible
to decreasing their work habits after obtaining the (silver) badge, so that
we can target these users and tailor incentive solutions for them in order to
increase their motivation (see Discussion Section). Therefore, it is critical to
know in advance which users will decrease their work on the platform and
which users will be maintaining the same levels of work.
6.1 Feature Extraction for Prediction Task
A user is represented by a vector that includes three distinct families of
predictor variables: user features, edit features and temporal features.
User Features include features specific to the user such as her age, length
of activity history in the system as well as the number of other SO
badge achievements won prior to the date when the silver badge was
awarded.
Edit Features included features that summarize the user’s edit history.
These features include the ratio of edit actions to other actions per-
formed on the system, statistics about what part of the posts they edit
(e.g. title or content) and how long are the comments describing each
edit.
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Temporal Features included features summarizing the user’s consistency
and intensity measures from different periods of time from the user’s
interaction history. We represent the history as a vector of mean con-
sistency values for each week of the user’s lifetime in the system, up
to day zero (and similarly for intensity values). To measure changes
in these two metrics, we average the consistency and intensity through
time for 3, 5 and 10 weeks prior to achieving the badge and the 3, 5,
and 10 weeks of a user’s activity in the system . For example, for a
given consistency history (c1, . . . , cn) of n weeks of activity, these fea-
tures average the consistency values (c1, . . . c3) for the first 3 weeks of
activity, and similarly for the first 5 and 10 weeks of activity prior to the
badge. We also create features for 3, 5 and 10 weeks of the user’s inter-
action history prior to receiving the badge. These features average the
consistency values (cn−2, . . . , cn) for the last 3 weeks of activity before
day zero, and similarly for the last 5 and 10 weeks of activity. Similar
features are defined relating to the intensity of users as well. This al-
lows the prediction to harness relative changes in the user’s behavior at
different points in time relative to day zero. Another important feature
in this family of features is the user’s activity group prior for obtaining
the badge.
The prediction task is whether the user will decrease her contributions and
move to a lower group type after receiving the silver badge. Specifically, we
predict whether high activity users descend to the medium activity group,
and whether medium activity users descend to the low activity group.
6.2 Prediction Results
We used the XGBoost classifier algorithm [10] for this prediction task, and
tried different combination of the following parameters: the number of used
trees, the maximum depth of the trees and the learning rate of the algorithm.
We used ten fold cross validation, with standard deviation of results between
runs smaller than 0.01 for all measures. As can be seen in Table 3, in most
regards, using all feature types produced the best results. However, note
that most of the prediction quality comes from using the temporal based
features. The user and edit features have relatively weak prediction ability
(a combination of them showed a negligible increase in prediction ability),
and using the temporal variables alone seems to give excellent results without
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requiring any extensive knowledge of the users themselves or their particular
editing habits.
Using the user and edit features alone led to a rather small number of
errors in one direction – fewer people were mistakenly predicted to decrease
their activity, when they did not (false positive). However, using the tem-
poral features alone, while increasing false positives, almost eliminated the
error of predicting people will not decrease their activity when the did (false
negative). When trying to prevent people from decreasing their activity,
false negatives are more important to focus on, because presumably, many
engaged users will brush off attempts to engage them further, while users
who are not targeted to prevent their dropping-out, are forever lost to the
system.
7 Question 3: Does Steering Generalize?
In this section we study whether steering generalizes to other Stack Exchange
projects and other badges.
7.1 Generalizing to Other Stack Exchange Projects
Figure 8 shows the average number of edit contributions as a function of the
number of days from day-zero (the day in which the silver badge was ob-
tained by the user) for all three projects: Stack-Overflow (top), Ask Ubuntu
(middle) and TeX-LaTeX (bottom) SE sites. The negative numbers to the
left of day-zero give the time in days prior to obtaining the badge. Accord-
ingly, the region to the right of the axis, with positive numbers, is the time
after getting the badge.
As shown by the figure, in all projects, users exhibit a sharp rise in ac-
tivity as they approach day zero, and following this day they exhibit a steep
decline in contribution, returning to their default rates of activity. The fig-
ure confirms that the steering effect identified by Anderson et al. [2] holds in
other projects as well. Moreover, the steering effect was not limited to only
voting actions and badges but appears to hold for editing action and badges
as well.
Furthermore, as analyzed in Section 4, in these projects as well, the be-
havior of each badge group is different, and there is no “one size fits all”
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Figure 8: Average number of edit contributions as a function of distance from
day-zero for obtaining silver badge on the Stack-Overflow (top), AskUbuntu
(middle) and TEX-LATEX SE sites (bottom).
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Low Medium High
Silver users 9,049 12,476 992
Gold users 368 993 960
Total 9,417 13,469 1,952
Table 4: Number of gold-vote and silver-vote users in each activity group
phenomena. The machine learning model which we have built for SO works
in these projects as well, and with similar performance.
7.2 Generalizing to the Vote Action
As mentioned earlier, the two measures we defined in order to characterize
user activity in the SE domain are work consistency and work intensity. We
can generalize these measures from dealing with edit actions to deal with
other action types, including vote actions. This is the same activity which
was analyzed by [3]. We want to show how the analysis that dealt with
the edit actions behavior can be generalize to vote actions, and point out
the differences between behavior under both of these badge types. The data
regarding the vote actions in each day is confidential, and was achieved using
a collaboration with the Stack Overflow academic research department. The
data is from the beginning of 2017, and we used all users who obtained the
silver-vote badge after April 2017, so that we will have enough data for the
time period of before obtaining the badge.
We used the same consistency/intensity measures we used for the edit
badges, and we use the k-means algorithm using the distance metric as de-
scribed in 4.1 to cluster all users who got at least the silver-vote badge into
three groups of activity: low, medium and high. Figure 9 shows the clusters
that were created, and Table 4 describes the amount of silver and gold users
in each group of activity. The number of users in each cluster has changed
dramatically from the edits analysis; here the largest group is of the medium
activity and not the low as it was in the edit analysis. We can also see
that the boundaries of the clusters “shifted”, and now a user with a consis-
tency median value of 0 and a intensity median value of 5 will be assigned
to the low activity group, rather to the medium activity group in the edit
analysis (same goes to the boundary between the medium and high activity
groups). The reason for these changes is that voting is a much easier and
more incidental action than editing.
21
Figure 9: Scatter plot of user voting activity showing three user groups re-
vealed by k-means (K=3). Groups are distinguished using colors and bound-
ary curves
As for the steering effect of the silver-vote badge, Figure 10 plots the con-
tributions of the different engagements groups over time, relative to day-zero,
when the silver-vote badge was awarded. We observe the same phenomena
as in Figure 4, regarding to how different user populations steer when receiv-
ing a badge. The high activity users steers more than the other two groups,
and they almost double the amount of votes in each day, comparing to their
baseline activity prior to getting the badge. The other two groups of activity,
medium and low, exhibit a far lower change in the activity on day-zero and
clearly return to their baseline activity. Results regarding the voting data
are also significant.
When looking at the users who received the silver-vote badge but not
the gold-vote badge, we observe a different insight from the one we outlined
for the same edit population. This group includes the users who made more
that 300 votes in SO but less than 600 votes. In Figure 11, we track the flow
of these users before and after obtaining the silver-vote badge. Here, unlike
we have seen in Figure 5, the amounts of users in each group do not seem
to change dramatically. Getting the silver-vote badge does not make users
vote less than they did before getting it. On the other hand, getting the
silver-vote badge also does not make them vote more than they did before.
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Figure 10: Median number of votes per day, centered around the day-zero
for achieving the silver-vote badge
We can say that these users are indifferent to receiving the silver-vote badge.
When looking at the users who were able to get the gold-vote badge, we
observe the insight we found regarding the gold-edit achievers (see Figure 6).
Here the vast majority of the gold-vote users belongs to the high activity
group in the time period of between getting the silver-vote and gold-vote
badges. Since the task of voting is easy for them, and they got some reward
for doing it (the silver-vote badge), they highly increase their vote actions
and become (or stay) high activity users. For them, the silver-vote badge had
a positive effect, it made them act more. Again, when the gold-vote badge
is achieved, we observe a decrease in voting activity; the amount of users in
each activity group is close to as it was before getting the silver-vote badge.
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Figure 11: Flow between user groups before (left) and after (right) getting
the silver-vote badge
8 Discussion & Future Work
Our main results in this paper elaborate and expand previous research on
badges (and in particular, [2]):
1. Reaction to badges varies greatly between different user populations. In
particular, large sections of users (e.g., our low-activity ones) register a
very small reaction to badges at all, while others show a reaction that
is at odds with model predictions, as they increase their work after
receiving the badge.
2. Engagement patterns of users can be an effective predictor, at least to
some degree, of future badge reception (e.g., high-activity users and
the gold badge). Classification of users based on their working habits
may be beneficial for understanding which people might benefit from
different incentives.
We observe a far more complex interaction between badges and user be-
havior than noted previously. Our results indicate that while for many users,
working intensely to receive a badge can be a one-time thing, for some users
(who are the most productive ones, from the platform’s point of view), badges
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Figure 12: Flow between user groups before getting the silver-vote badge
(left), after getting the silver-vote and before getting the gold-vote badge
(middle) and after getting the gold-vote badge (right)
have a different meaning. These users’ behavior seems to indicate that once
they receive their first meaningful badge, it encourages them to participate
in the badge environment, and they want to achieve more badges, until there
are no more to achieve. The badge seems to be the catalyst for such a pro-
cess, as prior to being awarded the silver badge, these users had much lower
activity levels. However, even for these types of users, the badge system is
meaningful, as once they have received a gold badge, they slowly drop off the
system.
Our observations here could be applied in different ways for different use-
cases. When a high rate of participation is needed, it is clear that badges
are failing to engage vast numbers of users, in particular the low-activity
users, and more importantly – those that do not even reach the stage of
silver badges. Perhaps a different set of incentives might be needed for these
users. On the other hand, badges are much more effective in motivating
persistent behavior from a subset of users, and there is potential for badge
behavior to focus on these users. For example, it may be beneficial to lower
the threshold for awarding badges, to allow for this activity catalyst to reach
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users who may be “sparked” by it, but prior to receiving the badge, had such
a low activity profile that they did not even reach the silver badge threshold.
This would allow for an earlier identification of the other engagement groups,
and hence to allow for focusing on the different incentives needed for each
of these populations. Similarly, medium-activity users are increasing their
activity after they receive the silver badge, taking quite a while to return
to usual work patterns. Perhaps if the next badge was not so distant (500
edits for gold vs. only 80 for silver), they might have seen the badge goal as
reachable, and become high-activity users, working to achieve it.
One limitation of our approach is that the empirical analysis does not
distinguish between steered and non-steered populations in SO. Indeed, mo-
tivations that underlie participants’ activities in the site may be influenced
by factors other than badge acquisition, such as motivation to contribute
to the community. The “bump” in their activity can be explained by their
natural activity patterns and would also occur in the absence of steering.
We answer this claim in two ways. First we computedactivitygraphs for
different acquisition thresholds for one of the badges in the study the voting
(“Electorate”) badge. The graph in Figure 8 shows the mean activity rate
(count of vote actions per day) of participants as a function of time relative
to some cumulative action threshold. The graph shows activity curves that
are centered on the true Threshold (600 actions), Threshold-10 (590 voting
actions); Threshold+10 (610 actions), and Threshold-100 (500 actions).
The graph shows there can be significant differences in the contribution
patterns depending on how the data is centered. The curve for Threshold+10
is noticeably different from the other curves with the decline in contributions
starting well before the Threshold cutoff point for this curve (the day in
which 610 actions were completed). The spike of the Threshold+10 curve is
much lower than the other curves. We argue that this is due to participants
decreasing their activity rates once the true threshold is crossed, which is
in line with the steering phenomenon. The curves for Threshold-10 and the
true threshold are similar in that they show an increase of activity leading
into the threshold cutoff followed by a sharp decline in activity. The spike
of these curves is also similar, possibly because many people cross these two
thresholds on the same day and get the badge. This trend is also in line with
the steering phenomenon. The fact the participation curves strongly depend
on how the data is centered with respect to the badge threshold implies that
at least part of their behavior can be attributed to the badge.
Additional support for the effect of badges on behavior was provided by
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Figure 13: Mean activity as a function of time relative to threshold
using the approach by Hoernle et al. [19] to separate those participants
motivated by steering from those that do not deviate from their “default”
activity distribution. Using this analysis, we discovered that about 38% of
medium-activity users in SO (at least 8 edits per week, rarely work more
than 4 days per week) are steered whereas only about 12% of high-activity
(above 8 edits per week, work more than 3 days per week) users are steered.
On the one hand, this shows that high level contributors will not be affected
by better badge design, but these users are already strong contributors to
SO. On the other hand, system designers can target medium-activity users,
who are both regular contributors to SO and respond positively to badges.
The intricate interaction we uncover between badges and user behavior
calls for much further research, and there is plenty left to do. For example,
the role of multiple badges is not yet fully understood. We are extending our
work to other types of badges (in particular, qualitative ones), and examine
personalized badge structure. For qualitative badges, we may need to devise
other measures for describing work progress towards a goal that go beyond
consistency and intensity. We intend to experiment with different badge
design schemes for engaging student learning in a soon-to-be-released MOOC.
Our long term goal is to direct system designers on how to design a badge
system optimally for a given platform. Also, we are studying how to design
intervention mechanisms that target individual users who are predicted to
decrease their contribution level. To this end it is necessary to reason about
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the trade-off that is made between interrupting or frustrating an engaged
user and between intervening with a user who might be disengaging with the
platform [29].
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